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Vol. II FEBRUARY, 1927 No. 5
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
CHARLES S. HYNEMAN*
The first paragraph of article III, section 2, of the constitu-
tion of the United States reads as follows:
The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising
under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made,
or which shall be made, under their authority; to all cases affecting am-
bassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; to all cases of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States
shall be a party; to controversies between two or more States; between
a State and citizens of another State, between citizens of different States,
between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of differ-
ent States, and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign
States, citizens or subjects.
This provision remained in full force until the adoption in
1798 of the eleventh amendment which reads as follows:
The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by citizens of another State or by citizens or subjects
of any foreign State.
This fundamental change in the federal constitution was pre-
cipitated by the decision of the United States Supreme Court
in 1793 that the judicial power of the United States extended to
a suit brought against one of the states of the Union by a citizen
of another state. This suit, Chisholm v. Georgia,' was the first
litigation in which the Supreme Court was called upon to decide
whether or not the constitution made a state liable to suit in the
federal Supreme Court at the instance of an individual. The
first suit to appear before the Supreme Court in the February
term of 1791 was instituted by a firm of Dutch bankers, as cred-
itors, against the state of Maryland 2 but the attorney general
*See biographical note, p. 397.
1 (1793), 2 Dallas 419, 1 L. Ed. 440.
2 Vanstlophorst v. Maryland (1791). The case is not reported by Dallas
but is referred to by Charles Warren in his The Supreme Court in United
371
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of Maryland answered to the plea without raising the question
of jurisdiction.3 During the February term of 1792 the Federal
Supreme Court heard the case of Indiana Company v. Virginia,
a suit which aroused the ire of the Virginia legislature and
caused a committee of that body to declare that "the State can
not be made a defendant in the said [United States Supreme]
Court at the suit of any individual or individuals, '4 but again
the question of jurisdiction was not raised as defense against
the action. During the same session in which the court heard
this suit against Virginia, one Oswald brought suit against the
state of New York.5 The case remained before the court until
1793 when the court proclaimed "that any person having author-
ity to appear for the State of New York is required to appear
accordingly," and announced that if the state failed to appear
by the first day of the next term or "show cause to the contrary"
judgment would be entered by default against the said state.6
The reports do not indicate that New York attempted to avoid
the judgment on the ground that the state could not be sued.
The great importance of Chisholm v. Georgia is due, then, to
the fact that in the earlier suits instituted by individuals against
members of the Union, the defendant state did not make defense
on the ground that the federal court did not have jurisdiction to
hear the suit. Chisholm v. Georgia first appeared before the
Supreme Court in the fall of 1792.7 The facts appear to be as
follows.8 A resident of Georgia left America prior to the Revo-
lutionary war and removed to England. Before leaving Georgia
he settled up a partnership account, taking bonds from his part-
ners as a part of the amount due him. After the establishment
of American independence the two partners who gave the bonds
suffered confiscation of their property by the state of Georgia
because of their enmity to the patriot cause. Chisholm, the
executor of the one who left Georgia, and so the holder of the
States History (3 vols. Boston, 1923), I, 91-93. Dallas does report the
grant of a motion made in the case. Vanstophorst v. Maryland (1791),
2 Dallas 401, 1 L. Ed. 433.
3 Justice Iredell in Chisholm v. Georgia, Supra., note 1, at 429, 1 L. Ed.
at 444.
4 Warren, op. cit. I, 91-92. The case is not reported by Dallas.
5 Oswald v. New York (1792), 2 Dallas 401, 1 L. Ed. 433.
6 2 Dallas 415, 1 L. Ed. 438. The case also appears at 2 Dallas 402,
1 L. Ed. 433. Neither Dallas nor Warren record the final disposition of
the case so it is not known whether or not a judgment was issued.
7 Supra, note 1.
8 The facts are not reported by Dallas but are given by Warren, op. cit.
I, 93, note 1.
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bonds given by the two partners, brought action in assumpsit to
force Georgia to pay the amount of the bonds on the ground
that they were given prior to the revolution and so established
a prior claim to the property confiscated by the state. Chisholm
was a citizen of South Carolina. Notice of the suit was served
on the governor and the attorney general of Georgia.
The state of Georgia refused to present a brief further than
to remonstrate that Georgia, being a state, could not be made
defendant to a suit brought by an individual in the federal
court. Edmund Randolph, then attorney general of the United
States in the cabinet of President Washington, argued the case
for the plaintiff. He addressed himself principally to the
question:
Can the State of Georgia, being one of the United States of America,
be made a party-defendant in any case, in the Supreme Court of the
United States, at the suit of a private citizen, even although he himself
is, and his testator was, a citizen of the State of South Carolina?9
Randolph argued that the United States Supreme Court was
given jurisdiction over the suit in article III, section 2, of the
constitution, which reads: "The judicial power [of the United
States] shall extend to . . . controversies between a State
and citizens of another State," and "In . . . those cases in
which a State shall be a party, the Supreme Court shall have
original jurisdiction." The burden of Randolph's argument was
to prove that, in the meaning of the constitution, the defendant
is a party to a suit as well as is the plaintiff, and that therefore
the constitution, in giving to the federal Supreme Court jurisdic-
tion over suits "in which a State shall be a party," vested in that
body authority to hear cases in which the state is defendant as
well as those in which the state is plaintiff. This conclusion,
Randolph also declared, was supported by the spirit of the con-
stitution as well as by the letter.
Randolph won over all of the court but Justice Iredell, and
this justice decided against the jurisdiction of the court on the
ground that Congress had not yet made the provisions which it
must necessarily make before the court could entertain a suit
brought against a state by a citizen of another state.' 0 Justices
Blair, Wilson, and Cushing, and Chief Justice Jay gave opinions
seriatim in favor of jurisdiction in this particular case. Chief
9 Supra, note 1, at 420, 1 L. Ed. at 418.
1OJames Brown Scott, Sovereign States and Suits before Arbitral
Tribunals and Courts of Justice (New York, 1925,, 45, 136, 159-160, seems
to hold that Justice Iredell dissented on the ground that the Constitution
did not contemplate that a State might be sued by an individual.
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Justice Jay was particularly cautious to point out that the deci-
sion in this case should not be taken as establishing that the
court would accept jurisdiction over all suits instituted against
a state.'1
The soundness of the majority opinion in this case was
sharply questioned in a decision of the same court almost a cen-
tury later. Justice Bradley, in giving the decision of the court
in Hans v. Louisiana,12 said:
The truth is, that the cognizance of suits and actions unknown to the
law, and forbidden by the law, was not contemplated by the Constitution
when establishing the judicial power of the United States.
Certainly a suit brought against a state by a citizen of an-
other state, as was the case in Chisholm v. Georgia, was unknown
to the common law, as Justice Iredell took no little pains to point
out in his dissenting opinion in that case.1 3 Justice Bradley's
remarks in Hans v. Louisiana concerning the holding in Chis-
holm v. Georgia questioned so strongly the wisdom of that deci-
sion that Justice Harlan found it necessary to append a concur-
ring opinion for the expressed purpose of protesting that the
references to the earlier case were uncalled for.
The decision of the court in Chisholm v. Georgia was re-
ceived with disapproval in almost all quarters of the United
States. 14 The people of Georgia were especially indignant, and
on November 21, 1793, the lower House of the Georgia legisla-
ture passed a bill which provided that any federal marshall or
any other person or persons who might try to execute ah order
of any federal court in favor of Alexander Chisholm "are here-
by declared to be guilty of felony, and shall suffer death, with-
out the benefit of clergy, by being hanged."'15
On February 2, 1793, the day after the reading of the opin-
ions in Chisholm v. Georgia, a resolution to amend the United
States constitution so as to forbid such suits as that which had
outraged Georgia was introduced in the federal House of Rep-
resentatives. The proposed amendment was tabled but in Jan-
uary, 1794, there was introduced the resolution, which, after
ratification by the necessary number of states became the elev-
enth amendment in 1798.16
11 Supra, note 1, at 479, 1 L. Ed. at 466.
12 (1889), 134 U. S. 1, 15, 33 L. Ed. 842, 847.
18 Supra, note 1, at 437-49, 1 L. Ed. 448-53.
14 Warren, op. cit. I, 96-99.
15 Herman V. Ames, editor, State Documents on Federal Relations:
The States and the United States. Number 1. (Philadelphia, 1900), 9-11.
16 Warren, op. cit. I, 100-01.
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During the period between the decision in Chisholm v.
Georgia and the adoption of the eleventh amendment, however,
suits were brought by individuals before the Supreme Court of
the United States naming as defendants the states of South
Carolina 17 and Virginia.' s Hollingsworth v. Virginia'9 was
the first to be considered by the court after the amendment
went into effect. In this case the court unanimously held that
the eleventh amendment superseded all actions already begun
against a state by citizens of another state or foreign state and
dismissed all suits of that nature then pending.
The outcome of no small amount of litigation has turned upon
the exact meaning of the eleventh amendment, and the forty-
three words contained in that addition to the constitution have
been elaborated by judicial interpretation into a small body of
law. The examination of the present meaning of the amend-
ment is the purpose of the body of this article.
I. Meaning of "suit in law or equity.' :0
As early as 1809 the question arose in a circuit court as to
whether or not the use of the expression "suit in law or equity"
was intended to exclude from the federal courts all suits ad-
miralty brought against a state by a citizen of another state.
The court held that the amendment did not preclude a federal
court from taking jurisdiction over such cases.21 In 1833 one
Juan Madrazo, a citizen of Spain, attempted to support in the
United States Supreme Court a suit against the state of Georgia
on the ground that his action was in admiralty. The court,
however, found that Madrazo's claim lay properly in law and
not in admiralty.22 Not until 1920 did the question come fairly
before the Supreme Court. In that year the court, reversing
the decision of the lower court,23 held that the eleventh amend-
ment barred suits in admiralty as well as those which were
clearly in law or equity.2 4 The language of the court is sig-
nificant-
It is true the Amendment speaks only of suits in law or equity; but
this is because, as was pointed out in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1, the
17 Huger v. South Carolina (1797), 3 Dallas 339, 1 L. Ed. 627.
18 Grayson v. Virginia (1796), 3 Dallas 320, 1 L. Ed. 619; Hollingsworth
v. Virginia (1798), 3 Dallas 378, 1 L. Ed. 644.
19Supra, note 18.
o Read the eleventh amendment.
21 U. S. v. Bright (1809), Fed. Case No. 14,647.
22Ex parte Juan Madrazo (1833), 7 Peters 627, 8 L. Ed. 808.
28 The Henry Koerber, Jr. (1920), 268 Fed. 561.
24Ex parts New York, No. 1 (1920), 256 U. S. 490, 65 L. Ed. 1057.
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Amendment was the outcome of a purpose to set aside the effect of the
decision of this court in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, which happened
to be a suit at law brought against the State by a citizen of another
State, the decision turning upon the construction of that clause of § 2 of
Art. III of the Constitution establishing the judicial power in cases in
law and equity between a State and citizens of another State; from which
it naturally came to pass that the language of the Amendment was par-
ticularly phrased so as to reverse the construction adopted in that case.
In Hans v. Louisiana, supra (p. 15), the court demonstrated the im-
propriety of construing the Amendment so as to leave it open for citizens
to sue their own State in the federal courts, and it seems to us equally
clear that it cannot with propriety be construed to leave open a suit
against a State in the admiralty jurisdiction by individuals, whether its
own citizens or not.25
The words of the court in this case would seem to establish
that the expression "any suit in law or equity" was intended
to prevent all suits, in no matter what branch of jurisprudence.
This reasoning would also seem to lead to the conclusion that
the word "suits" is broad enough to cover the term "controver-
sies" appearing in article III, section 2 of the constitution 26 and
so make it unnecessary to consider here the vexing question as
to whether or not the words "cases" and "controversies" are
used synonymously in that article.
II. Meaning of the words "commenced or prosecuted.127
The case of Cohens v. Virginia28 came to the United States
Supreme Court on appeal from the decision of the highest Vir-
ginia court which sustained a conviction of Cohens for violation
of a state law. The suit, being a criminal prosecution, was
commenced in the first instance by the state of Virginia. Co-
hens appealed the case to the United States Supreme Court on
a federal question. Virginia excepted to the jurisdiction of the
federal court on the ground that the appearance of the case on
Cohens' appeal marked it as a suit commenced by an individual
against a state and so one barred by the eleventh amendment.
Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering the decision of the court,
did not point out that the suit, being a controversy between
Virginia and one of its own citizens, was not covered by the
25 Ib. 497-98, 65 L. Ed. at 1061.
26 The Supreme Court seems only once to have discussed the meaning of
the word "suit" as it appears in the eleventh amendment. In Cohens v.
Virginia (1821), 6 Wheaton 264, 407, 5 L. Ed. 257, 292, Chief Justice
Marshall defined "suit" as the prosecution or pursuit of some claim, de-
mand or request.
27 Read the eleventh amendment.
28 Supra, note 26.
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eleventh amendment. He handled the case just as if Cohens
were not a citizen of Virginia and found the amendment inap-
plicable because the suit was not "commenced or prosecuted"
by Cohens. In a case where a suit was instituted in first instance
by the state, and appealed to the federal court by the defendant
individual, the Chief Justice said, the suit could not be held to
be "commenced or prosecuted" in the federal court by the indi-
vidual. 20 That the act of appealing the case from state to fed-
eral court did not constitute the "commencing" of a new suit,
there can be little question. The transfer of a case, on appeal,
from the sovereignty of the state to the sovereignty of the fed-
ral government might at first seem to be quivalent to insti-
tuting a new proceeding. But, in fact, the jurisdiction of the
state court is to an extent identical with the jurisdiction of the
federal court ;30 and as early as 1789 Congress had provided in
a statute that cases in the state courts might be appealed to the
United States Supreme court if the highest state court had de-
cided against the validity of a federal treaty or statute, or an
authority exercised under the United States, or had decided in
favor of the validity of a state statute which had been ques-
tioned on the ground that it was repugnant to the constitution,
laws or treaties of the United States.31 This would seem to
indicate very clearly that an appeal from a state court to the
federal court on the ground of a federal question was merely
a continuation of the suit and not the "commencement" of a new
action. The eleventh amendment reads, however, that the fed-
eral judicial power shall not extend to suits "prosecuted" against
a state by a citizen of another state. Marshall's contention was
that Cohens, being merely appellant in a cause instituted by a
state, could not be said to be prosecuting the case. Little would
be gained by discussing here the probable correctness or incor-
rectness of Marshall's interpretation of the word "prosecuted"
for it is now established beyond any question that a state may
be made defendant on appeal in an action which it began against
an individual.
29 Supra, note 26, at 410, 412, 5 L. Ed. at 292, 293.
30 By virtue of Article VI, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United
States.
31 Section 25 of An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United
States, approved Sept. 24, 1789. The Public Statutes at Large of the
United States, edited by Richard Peters, I (Boston, 1850), 85-87.
The constitutionality of the clause of the act which is set forth above
was upheld by the Supreme Court in this same case of Cohens v. Virginia.
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Marshall's decision in Cohens v. Virginia was very nicely
supplemented almost eighty years later in Smith v. Reeves 32 in
which the Supreme Court held that where a state permits itself
to be sued by an individual in its own courts any federal ques-
tion there presented will be heard on appeal by the United States
Supreme Court. In keeping with these two decisions is the hold-
ing of a federal circuit court that where a state institutes a suit
against an individual of another state in its own courts, and
the defendant obtains a removal to a federal court, a cross bill
filed by the defendant is not a suit commenced or prosecuted
against the state.33
III. When is the suit one "against a state"? 4
The immunity from suit which the eleventh amendment offers
to states has been clutched at by many a lawyer intent on deliver-
ing his client from the reaches of the federal courts. Conse-
quently the reports contain a great number of cases in which
the courts have found it necessary to find as to the validity of
an exception to federal jurisdiction made on the ground that the
suit was one commenced against a state. Upon some points the
cases are in agreement.
1. Suits against political divisions of the state.
It seems to be well established that a suit against a political
division of the state is not a suit against the state within the
meaning of the eleventh amendment, and. so not one forbidden
by. that amendment. Two United States Supreme Court deci-
sions, Mercer County v. Cowles,35 and Lincoln County v. Lun-
ing,36 clearly established that a suit against a county is not one
against a state. In the latter of these two decisions the court
said:
it may be observed that the records of this court for the last thirty years
are full of suits against counties, and it would seem as though by gen-
eral consent the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts in such suits had be-
come established. But irrespective of the general acquiescence, the juris-
diction of the Circuit Courts is beyond question. The Eleventh Amend-
ment limits the jurisdiction only as to suits against a State.37
32 (1899), 178 U. S. 436, 445, 44 L. Ed. 1140, 1145. This was reas-
serted in Chandler v. Dix (1903), 194 U. S. 590, 592, 48 L. ed. 1129, 1131.
83 Port Royal & Atlantic Ry. v. South Carolina (1894), 60 Fed. 552.
34 Read the eleventh amendment.
35 (1868), 7 Wallace 118, 19 L. Ed. 86.
86 (1889), 133 U. S. 529, 33 L. Ed. 766.
87 Ib. 530, 33 L. Ed. at 767.
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The Supreme Court seems never to have been called upon to
decide whether or not a proceeding against a city is forbidden
by the eleventh amendment, but lower federal courts have held
that the amendment had no reference to such suits.8 Undoubt-
edly the same would be held as to other municipal corporations.
2. Suits against territories.
There seems to be no case in which a court has decided that
a territory is not a state within the meaning of the eleventh
amendment. However, it has been held that a citizen of a ter-
ritory can not bring into the federal courts a suit against a citi-
zen of a state on the ground that the controversy is between
citizens of different states, nor can a citizen of a territory be
sued by a citizen of a state in the federal courts on that
ground.39 In an early case, Chief Justice Marshall, holding that
the act of Congress which provided for the removal of cases to
the federal courts on the ground that the parties to the litiga-
tion were citizens of different states did not extend to a suit
brought by a citizen of the District of Columbia aganist a citi-
zen of a state, declared that the word '"state" in article III, sec-
tion 2 of the constitution contemplated only the "members of
the American Confederation." 40 One may conclude from this
statement of Marshall that a suit against a territory is not a
suit against a state in the meaning of that same article, and
consequently not a suit barred by the eleventh amendment, for
it has been pointed out above that that amendment was added
to the constitution only to withdraw a jurisdiction declared by
the Supreme Court to have been vested by that article.41
3. Suits against a corporation of which a state is a member.
In 1824 the United States Supreme Court was called upon to
decide whether or not a suit brought against a corporation
which was created by Georgia, and a part of the stock of which
was owned by Georgia, was to such an extent a suit against the
state as to be one forbidden by the eleventh amendment. The
court held that the bank was "not the State of Georgia although
38Palatka Waterworks v. City of Palatka (1903), 127 Fed. 161; Cam-
den Interstate Ry. v. City of Catlettsburg (1904), 129 Fed. 421.
39 Hepburn and Dundas v. Ellzey (1805), 2 Cranch 444, 2 L. Ed. 332;
New Orleans v. Winter (1816), 1 Wheaton 91, 4 L. Ed. 44; Barney v.
Baltimore (1867), 6 Wallace 280, 18 L. Ed. 825; Hooe v. Jamieson (1896),
166 U. S. 395, 41 L. Ed. 1049; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Lott (1921), 275
Fed. 365.
40 Hepburn and Dunda8 v. ElIzey, 8upra, note 39, at 452, 2 L. Ed. at
335.
41 Supra at note 25.
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the State holds an interest in it. ' '42 Accordingly the suit was
not against the state. The decision has been followed even
where the state owned all of the stock in the corporation 43 and
where as many as two-thirds of the directors were appointed
by the governor.44
4. A suit against a, state officer is not always a suit against
a state.
One of the first defenses of a state official who finds himself
hard pressed by a federal process is to urge that the proceed-
ing is in reality an action against the state and so not within the
competence of the federal court. It then falls to the court to
find whether the state or the individual is the actual defendant.
Chief Justice Marshall early laid it down as a rule for such
cases that if the action appeared in the federal court on account
of the diverse citizenship of the parties, and not because a fed-
eral question was involved, the court would not look beyond the
record to discover the actual defendant. The words of the Chief
Justice were:
It may, we think, be laid down as a rule which admits of no exception,
that, in all cases where jurisdiction depends upon the party, it is the
party named in the record. Consequently the eleventh amendment, which
restrains the jurisdiction granted by the Constitution over suits, is, of
necessity, limited to those suits in which a State is a party on the record.45
This rule was interpreted by Justice Swayn in Davis v. Gray'4
to apply to suits pleading a federal question as well as to those
42Bank of the U. S. v. Planters' Bank of Georgia (1824), 9 Wheaton
904, 907, 6 L. Ed. 244.
43 Bank of Kentucky v. Wister (1829), 2 Peters 318, 7 L. Ed. 437.
44 Southern Ry. v. North Carolina By. (1897), 81 Fed. 595.
Other cases on this subject are: Louisville By. v. Letson (1844), 2
Howard 497, 11 L. Ed. 353; and Martin v. Branch Bank (1840), 14 La.
415.
45 Osborn v. Bank of the U. S. (1826), 9 Wheaton 738, 857, 6 L. Ed.
204, 232. This rule may fairly be called a dictum since in the case at
hand jurisdiction lay in the federal court not because of diverse citi-
zenship of the parties, but because a federal question was involved. The
rule was followed without comment by a circuit court in 1851, and fur-
nished ground for the decision that an action in assumpsit brought against
a captain of marines to recover for rations and supplies furnished him
for his official needs while in actual command of forces, was not a suit
against the federal government. Tyler v. Walker (1851), Fed. Case No.
14, 311a.
46 (1870), 16 Wallace 203, 220, 21 L. Ed. 447, 453. It might be con-
tended that Justice Swayne did not intend to put this construction upon
Justice Marshall's rule, but Justice Matthews seemed to think that that
was his intention. Ex parte Ayres (1887), 123 U. S. 443, 488, 31 L. Ed. 216,
223.
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claiming federal jurisdiction on ground of diverse citizenship.
So also Justice Matthews, delivering the opinion of the Supreme
Court in Ex parte Ayers,47 seemed to construe the rule. If Jus-
tice Marshall intended to prescribe that in no case will the fed-
eral court look beyond the record to ascertain the actual defend-
ant, he himself abandoned the rule.48
What seems a fairly safe guide for the court in determining
whether a suit is in fact against a state or against an individual
was laid down in 1799 by Justice Washington in the case of
Fowler v. Lindsey.4 9 There the Supreme Court was called upon
to decide whether a litigation over certain lands was not in fact
a controversy between the states of New York and Connecti-
cut, although the record contained the names of only private
citizens of the two states. The Justice declared that a case, to
belong "to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court on the account
of the interest that a State has in the controversy, must be a
case in which a State is either nominally or substantially the
party."
Many cases might be cited in which the court has found that
although the state did not appear as a party on the record it
must nevertheless be held to be the real defendant.50 But these
same cases indicate that an official of the state who finds him-
self hailed before the federal court can not escape justice on
a flimsy pretense that the process is directed against the state
and so barred by the eleventh amendment. The interest of the
state in the cause must be real and substantial.51 And the court
47 Supra, note 46, loc. cit.
48 Governor of Georgia v. Juan Madrazo (1828), 1 Peters 110, 7 L. Ed.
73. An extended but not exhaustive search through the reports has failed
to reveal any cases in which the court did look back of the record to
find the defendant to a suit brought in the federal court on the ground
of diversity of citizenship.
49 (1799), 3 Dallas 411, 412, 1 L. Ed. 658, 659. Worthy of considera-
tion, too, is the suggestion of the court in South Carolina. v. Wesley (1894),
155 U. S. 542, 545, 39 L. Ed. 254, 255, that if the state does not volun-
tarily declare itself a defendant in a case in which it is interested but
not nominally the defendant, the court must hold that the state is not
in fact the defendant. Cf. U. S. v. Lee (1882), 106 U. S. 196, 197, 27.
L. Ed. 171, 173.
6o A few of the cases in which states were declared to be the real de-
fendants, although not appearing as such on the record are: Hagood v.
Southern (1885), 117 U. S. 52, 29 L. Ed. 805; Ex parte Ayres, supra, note
46; Fitts v. McGhee (1898), 172 U. S. 516, 43 L. Ed. 535; Smith v. Reeves,
supra, note 32; Chandler v. Dix, supra, note 32.
51 The considerations determining whether or not a suit brought nom-
inally against an officer of a state is necessarily a suit against the state
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
is not to refuse to hear the suit until there is a legal certainty
that it has no jurisdiction. 52
IV. Citizens of another state or citizens or subjects of any
foreign state.53
1. Corporations are citizens.
The courts seem never to have stated specifically that a cor-
poration is, within the meaning of the eleventh amendment, a
citizen of the state which created it. However, in Marsiall v.
Baltimore and Ohio R. R. 5 4 the federal Supreme Court found
that a corporation is a citizen of the state from which it received
its charter within the meaning of the provision, in article III,
section 2 of the constitution, that the jurisdiction of the federal
courts shall extend to controversies between citizens of differ-
ent states. In Pennsylvania v. Quicksilver Mining Co.5 5 the
court assumed, relying upon Marshall v. Baltimore and Ohio
for authority, that a corporation was barred by the eleventh
amendment from bringing suit in the federal courts against a
state other than the one which created it. In Smith v. Reeves 8
the court went a step farther and held that a corporation cre-
ated, not by a state but by Congress, was barred by the eleventh
amendment from suing a state in the federal courts. The court
reasoned that the amendment could not have intended to relieve
a state from suits instituted by individuals and corporations of
other states and yet leave it liable to suit at the hand of a cor-
poration holding a charter from the federal government. 57 The
court did not go so far as to say that the corporation was a citi-
zen of a state within the meaning of the eleventh amendment; it
merely said that that amendment barred the corporation from
suing a state in the federal courts.
2. A state can not lend its name to individuals.
The constitution, as originally adopted, extended the judicial
power to controversies between states58 and this jurisdiction
and so barred by the eleventh amendment can be set out only at aDme
length. The writer hopes to make this the subject of an article to appear
in this JOURNAL in the future.
52Barry v. Edmunds (1885), 116 U. S. 550, 559, 29 L. Ed. 729, 732.
53 See the eleventh amendment.
54 (1853), 16 Howard 314, 14 L. Ed. 953.
55 (1870), 10 Wallace 553, 19 L. Ed. 998.
56 Supra, note 32.
57 Ib. 449, 44 L. Ed. at 1146.
58 Article III, section 2.
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was, of course, not destroyed by the eleventh amendment.59 The
willingness of the Supreme Court to adjudicate disputes between
states is not, however, to furnish an artifice whereby an individ-
ual can utilize those channels to obtain redress of his own griev-
ance against a state. In the cases of New Hampshire and New
York v. Louisiana,60 the United States Supreme Court held that
the suits were in legal effect commenced by and prosecuted by
the citizens and not by the states whose names appeared as
plaintiffs in each case, that in each case the state and the attor-
ney general of the state were only nominal actors in the pro-
ceedings. Jurisdiction was therefore denied as being forbidden
by the eleventh amendment. In South Dakota v. North Caro-
lina,61 however, the court decided that a gift of bonds to the state
of South Dakota was bona fide, and that a suit brought by that
state against North Carolina to recover for the bonds was a
controversy between states. The case arose out of the refusal
of the state of North Carolina to redeem certain of its bonds
held by one Simon Schafer, a citizen of New York. In March,
1901, the state of South Dakota passed a statute requiring the
attorney general to take necessary proceedings to protect the
right or title of the state in all gifts made to the state. In Sep-
tember of the same year Schafer presented South Dakota with
some of his North Carolina bonds. In accordance with the law
of March, 1901, the attorney general of South Dakota brought
action in the United States Supreme Court and obtained judg-
ment for the value of the bonds. Four judges dissented from
the decision, however, believing that Schafer was the actual
complainant.
In a recent suit against the state of Minnesota,02 North Da-
kota alleged that the use of certain drainage ditches by that
state was causing the overflow of the Bois de Sioux River upon
land in North Dakota. Therefore North Dakota sought (1) an
injunction to compel the state of Minnesota to discontinue the
use of the ditches, and (2) damages to compensate North Da-
kota land owners for injuries caused by the overflow. The
Supreme Court held that the suit for injunction was a contro-
versy between states, and granted the relief sought. The prayer
for damages to be awarded to individuals was held, however,
69Rhode Island v. Massachusetts (1838), 12 Peters 657, 731, 9 L. Ed.
1233, 1263. See also Cohens v. Virginia, supra, note 26, at 406, 5 L. Ed.
at 291.
30 (1882), 108 U. S. 76, 27 L. Ed. 656.
61 (1903), 192 U. S. 286, 48 L. Ed. 448.
02North Dakota v. Minnesota (1923), 263 U. S. 365, 68 L. Ed. 342.
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to be not a controversy between states but one between citizens
of North Dakota and the state of Minnesota. The court refused
either to award damages to the injured land owners, or to award
damages to the state of South Dakota to be turned over to indi-
vidual claimants.
3. The eleventh amendment has no reference to suits be-
tween a state and its own citizens.
In 1870 Pennsylvania instituted a suit against the Quicksilver
Mining Company,6" bringing its action in the federal court on
the ground that the defendants were a California corporation.
The Supreme Court decided that in fact the defendants were a
Pennsylvania corporation and refused to hear the suit, on the
ground that the United States constitution did not extend the
federal judicial power to cases or controversies between a state
and its own citizens. The dispute between the parties arose
under no federal law, the sole ground for getting the case into the
federal court being that it was a suit between a state and a citi-
zen of a different state. Hans v. Louisiana64 presented a finer
question, a citizen of Louisiana attempting to sue that state on
a federal question. The plaintiff argued that the federal court
must hear the case, regardless of the character of the parties,
inasmuch as the suit was one arising under the constitution and
laws of the United States. The Supreme Court rejected the
argument. The constitution, it said, did not contemplate giving
to the federal court jurisdiction over suits of any nature,
brought against a state contrary to its will by one of its own
citizens.65 It seems safe to conclude that the eleventh amend-
ment could not have affected the jurisdiction of the federal courts
over suits which were not subject to the federal jurisdiction
previous to that amendment.
4. Are citizens of a territory "citizens of another State?"
It appears that no court has found it necessary to decide
whether or not the eleventh amendment is to serve as a bar to
suits brought against a state by a citizen of a territory. It was
pointed out above that the clause in article III, section 2 of the
63 Pennsylvania. v. Quicksilver Mining Co., supra, note 55.
64Supra, note 12.
65 It was here that Justice Bradley made the statement quoted above
(p. 5), to the effect that the constitution did not intend to vest in the
federal courts jurisdiction over any suits which were unknown to the
common law.
In North Carolina v. Temple (1889), 134 U. S. 22, 33 L. Ed. 849, the
court reached the same conclusion as in this case.
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constitution, "between citizens of different States," was not
broad enough to cover suits between citizens of a state and citi-
zens of a territory. It might be reasoned from analogy that the
plhrase "citizens of another State" appearing in the eleventh
amendment is likewise too narrow to include citizens of a ter-
Titory. On the other hand, if the phrase is broad enough to bar
suits instituted by corporations created by the federal govern-
ment it might well give immunity from suits in which a citizen
of a territory is plaintiff. It is submitted that when occasion
arises, the courts will probably refuse to hear an action which
seeks to make a state a defendant at the suit of a citizen of a
territory.
V. A state may waive the immunity given it by the eleventh
amendment.
It has been shown above that the Supreme Court has inter-
preted the eleventh amendment to permit that court to hear
upon appeal any federal question involved in a suit begun in a
state court against a state by a citizen of another state. The
jurisdiction of the federal judiciary over suits between states
and citizens of other states was appreciably widened in 1882
by the decision of the same court in Clark v. Barnard68 that if
a state voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court, the
federal courts will entertain in first instance a suit brought
against it by a citizen of another state. It is not clear just
what branch or agent of the government has authority to waive
the state's immunity from suit. In Nicholl v. United States67
the Supreme Court declared-
Every government has an inherent right to protect itself against suits,
and if, in the liberality of legislation, they are permitted, it is only on
such terms and conditions as are prescribed by statute.
A year later the court expressly stated that the consent of the
United States to be sued by an individual could be given only
by an "act of Congress expressly authorizing it" and that the
power to give this consent did not exist "in any officer of the
government."eR In the case of United States v. Lee69 decided
a short time before Clark v. Barnard, the court seemed to infer
that only the state legislature could give consent to the suit. A
federal district court holding seems to clearly establish this
60 (1882), 108 U. S. 436, 27 L. Ed. 780.
67 (1868), 7 Wallace 122, 126, 19 L. Ed. 125, 127.
68 The Davis (1869), 10 Wallace 15, 19, 20, 19 L. Ed. 875, 877.
69 Supra, note 49.
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point 7o yet it seems unwise to rely upon this as a rule. If the
attorney should appear before the federal court and make de-
fense on the merits of the case, in a suit brought nominally
against a state by a citizen of another state, the court probably
would hear the action without inquiring by what authority the
attorney general subjected the state to the suit. Again, it may
happen that the attorney general is the defendant on the record
to a suit which is really directed against the state.7 1 Undoubt-
edly the failure of the attorney general, or some other repre-
sentative of the state, to make exception to the jurisdiction of
the court on the ground that the suit is against the state will
conclude the court that it should hear the case.72 Yet the actual
giving of consent to the suit in this case would not have been
embodied in a statute at all.
While a state which has waived the immunity given it in the
eleventh amendment may undoubtedly retract its concession
and refuse to be sued in the federal courts by citizens of other
states,78 its action for that purpose can not withdraw from the
federal court jurisdiction over a suit which was already in the
process of adjudication before the retracting step was taken.7 4
The state may name conditions which must be met before it will
70 Galbes v. Girard (1891), 46 Fed. 500.
71 See note 50 for cases which were brought nominally against officials
but which were found to be actually suits against the state.
72 This conclusion seems amply justified by South Carolina v. Wesley,
supra, note 49, at 545, 39 L. Ed. at 255. For cases somewhat analogous
to this hypothetical situation, see First National Bank of Charlotte v.
Morgan (1889), 132 U. S. 141, 33 L. Ed. 282, in which the voluntary ap-
pearance of the bank waived the immunity from suit which had been
granted it by a federal statute; and Stoner v. Rice (1889), 121 Ind. 51,
6 L. R. A. 387, in which acceptance of suit by an auditor precluded him
from later objecting to tthe jurisdiction of the court on the ground that
the suit was against the state. Of interest in this connection, also, are
Interstate Construction Co. v. Regents of the University of Idaho (1912),
199 Fed. 509; St. Louis & San Francisco R. R. v. McBride (1891), 141
U. S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659; and Texas & Pacific R. R. v. Cox (1E,91), 145
U S. 593, 36 L. Ed. 829.
There remains the possibility, of course, that the court, after hearing
the facts and the argument in such a case as that imagined, may con-
clude that the state is vitally concerned in the suit and dismiss the action
on the ground that since the state is not named as a defendant, the bill
is' improperly drawn. It was on that ground that the supreme court
dismissed the action in Christia% v. Atlantic & North Carolina R. R.
(1889), 133 U. S. 233, 33 L. Ed. 589.
73 See Beers v. Arkansas (1858), 20 Howard 527, 15 L. Ed. 991.
74 Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line (1905), 200 U. S. 273, 50 L. Ed. 477.
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permit itself to be sued in the federal courts, 75 and the federal
courts will hear, of course, only those suits to which the state
has indicated a willingness to consent. It is a rule in state
courts that statutes giving the state's consent to be sued will be
very narrowly construed. 76 The federal courts also seem to be
cautious about deciding that a state has given its consent to be
sued in the federal courts77 but it is clear that consent to be sued
can be found where it is not expressly stated.7 8 The decision
of the highest state court that the state has waived its immunity
from suit will conclude the federal court 79 and a decision of the
state court that the state has not consented to the suit will bear
some weight with the federal court.80
The creation of a state agency or institution and making it
liable to suit without clearly designating that it is not to be
sued in the federal courts has been construed to waive the im-
munity given in the eleventh amendment.8' However, it is es-
tablished now that a state may permit itself to be sued in its
own courts by its own citizens or by citizens of other states, and
yet retain its immunity from similar suit in the federal courts.
For a time after 1893 it appeared that this was not the case,
and the confusion doubtless arose out of the following statement
by Justice Brewer in Reagan v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co.82
For it may be laid down as a general proposition that, whenever a
citizen of a State can go into the courts of a State to defend his property
against the illegal acts of its officers, a citizen of another State may in-
voke the jurisdiction of the federal courts to maintain a like defense. A
State cannot tie up a citizen of another State, having property rights
with its territory invaded by unauthorized acts of its own officers, to suits
for redress in its own courts. Given a case where a suit can be main-
75 Beers v. Arkansas, supra, note 73. The state, in this case, had given
consent to be used in its own courts but it is not clear that it had consenied
to be sued in the federal courts. See also U. S. v. Lee, supra, note 49.
76 Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Chambers (California Supreme
Court, 1915), 145 Pac. 1025; Mississippi v. Joiner (1852), 23 Miss. 500;
Raymond v. State (1877), 54 Miss. 562, 28 Am. Rep. 382.
77 A good example is Lankford v. Platte Iron Works (1914), 235 U. S.
461, 59 L. Ed. 316.
78 Phoenix Lumber Co. v. Regents of the University of Idaho (1908),
197 Fed. 425; Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line, supra, note 74; Smith v,
Rackliffe (1898), 87 Fed. 964.
79 Interstate Construction Co. v. Regents of the Univeirsity of Idaho,
supra, note 72.
80 Lankford v. Platte Iron Works, supra, note 77.
81 Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line, supra, note 74; Interstate Construction
Co. v. Regents of the University of Idaho, supra, note 72; R. R. Com-
mission of Louisiana v. Texas & Pacific Ry. (1906), 144 Fed. 68.
82 (1893), 154 U. S. 362, 391, 38 L. Ed. 1014, 1021.
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tained in the courts of the State to protect property rights, a citizen of
another State may invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Six years after this decision a federal court gave a quotation
from the above expression as authority for a decision that the
consent of a state to be sued in its own courts gave citizens of
other states a right to bring similar suits in the federal courts~8
In Smith v. Rackliffe,84 however, a federal district judge found
that the opening of its own courts by a state to suits against
itself did not necessarily imply that the state was willing to be
sued in the federal courts. This decision was upheld on appeal
to the Supreme Court, appearing there as Smith v. Reeves,8 5
and has twice since been reaffirmed by that body.86
SUMMARY
One paragraph will serve to recapitulate the principal points
which have been established to date in the interpretation of the
eleventh amendment.
1. The amendment is a restraint, not only upon suits in law
or equity but also upon suits in admiralty.
2. When a state brings an action against an individual, it
can not later invoke the eleventh amendment to prevent the
hearing of an appeal or a cross-bill filed by the defendant.
3. The amendment applies only to suits against the forty-
eight states and offers no immunity from suit to political divisions
of a state, nor to a corporation in which a state is the sole stock-
holder, nor, if one may reason from analogy, to territories.
Neither does it relieve from suit the officers of a state, but
where a federal question is involved in a suit brought nominally
against a state official the court is open to evidence intended to
show that the state is a necessary defendant.
4. The amendment applies to suits instituted against a state
by corporations of another state or by corporations of federal
creation, as well as to suits introduced by individuals of other
states, and the court will look back of the record to discover the
real plaintiff even though one of the forty-eight states appear
83 Dinsmore v. Southern Express Co. (1899), 92 Fed. 714. Similar
holding in Reinhart v. McDonald (1896), 76 Fed. 403, which was reversed
in Smitk v. Rackliffe, supra, note 78.
84 Supra, note 78.
8 5 Supra, note 32.
86 Chandler v. Dix, supra, note 32; and Murray v. Wilson Distilling
Co. (1908), 213 U. S. 151, 53 L. Ed. 742.
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as nominal plaintiff. But the amendment has no reference to
suits brought against a state by one of its own citizens.
5. A state may waive the immunity given to it in the eleventh
amendment and permit itself to be sued on such conditions as it
may name; and the intention of a state to permit itself to be
sued can sometimes be discovered where it is not expressly given.
